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NOTES AND COMMENTS
NOTE: CANONS OF JUDICIAL
ETHICS - EXTRA JUDICIAL
ACTIVITIES
The Preamble1 to the Canons of Judicial
Ethics2 sets forth the necessity and purpose
of the code. It provides that since "declared
ethical standards tend to become habits of
life"' it was deemed advisable to set forth
1 "In addition to the Canons for Professional Con-
duct of Lawyers which it has formulated and
adopted, the American Bar Association, mindful
that the character and conduct of a judge should
never be objects of indifference, and that declared
ethical standards tend to become habits of life,
deems it desirable to set forth its views respecting
those principles which should govern the personal
practice of members of the judiciary in the admin-
istration of their office. The Association accord-
ingly adopts the following Canons, the spirit of
which it suggest as a proper guide and reminder
for judges, and as indicating what the people have
a right to expect from them." Preamble, Canons
of Judicial Ethics, A.B.A. CANONS OF PROFESSION-
AL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS 45 (1957) (hereinafter
cited as A.B.A. CANONS).
2 Quaere: Why are there separate canons applica-
ble to judges and lawyers? This is apparently due
to the inherent difference in the functions of the
bench and bar. The bench acts in an impartial
manner; the bar, on the other hand, acts as a pro-
tagonist. Jackson, Comparative Sidelights on the
Ethics of the Bench and Bar, 28 DICTA 81 (1951).
3 PREAMBLE, supra note 1.
these principles to guide judges and to indi-
cate what the "people have a right to expect
from them." 4
In addition to this, there are other reasons
that justify the existence of a code which
regulates the activities of judges. Such a
code serves as a guide in situations where
the proper course of conduct may seem
doubtful.' It stimulates public interest in the
proper standards of judicial conduct and
may, thus, generate greater respect for the
judicial office.0
This note is concerned, almost exclu-
sively, with the pertinent provisions of the
Canons that apply to extrajudicial activi-
ties. 7 It deals with the ethical implications
that arise when a judge performs adminis-
trative functions for the executive depart-
ment, appears on radio and television broad-
casts, and makes charitable contributions.
4 Ibid. Furthermore "judges who are members of
the American Bar Association are expected to ob-
serve these canons." Mason, Judges in Politics, 28
DICTA 85, 87 (1951).
5 See 1959 N.Y. REPORT OF COMMITTEE OF
ETHICS AND STANDARDS 11.
r Ibid.
For a discussion of extrajudicial activities of
judges from the standpoint of both the common
law and the Canons of Judicial Ethics, see 47 IOWA
L. REV. 1026 (1962).
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Other extra judicial activities to be dis-
cussed will include his relations with his
former partners, his participation in busi-
ness, his personal relations and investments,
his acceptance of gifts and favors, and mem-
bership in religious, educational and societal
institutions.
JUDICIAL CANON 24-
INCONSISTENT OBLIGATIONS
Administrative Functions
Because there was a scarcity of capable
men for public office in the early history of
the United States, a need arose to use judges
in nonjudicial capacities. Although this
practice has been continued s it is now criti-
cized on two grounds, i.e., the impact on the
judge himself, and the impact on the public.
If the practice of appointing judges to
positions in the executive department be-
comes widespread, judges might see in such
appointments political opportunity, both for
themselves and for the Chief Executive.9
Thus, judges may expect a reward for their
service to the Chief Executive.' 0 This could
take the form of a higher judicial position or
else a high position in the executive branch
of the government.
If judges perform nonjudicial activities on
behalf of the President they expose them-
selves to political attack." When a judge
acts in his judicial capacity he can rely upon
the record of facts and the opinion of his
colleagues as support. However, when he
8 Independence of Judges: Should They Be Used
for Non-Judicial Work?, 33 A.B.A.J. 792, 795
(1947).
9 Id. at 793.
10 Id. at 795. See also 1 WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 120-21 (rev.
ed. 1947).
"Mason, Extra-Judicial Work For Judges: The
Views of Chief Justice Stone, 67 HARv. L. REV.
193, 204 (1953).
performs nonjudicial functions these sup-
ports are absent. 12 Because a judge cannot
defend his actions either in political debate
or in any other public manner, 13 he could
conceivably be placed in a position which
would impair the performance of his judicial
duties.
In addition to having a deleterious effect
upon judges themselves, the performance of
nonjudicial work might lower the esteem of
the judiciary in the eyes of the public. 14 If
we accept the fact that the stability of the
court system is dependent upon public re-
spect and confidence,15 it would appear that
a judge's administrative duties must be kept
to a minimum. It is not sufficient that judges
be honest; they must be beyond reproach in
the public eye.1 6
It may be conceded that judges are pre-
eminently qualified to perform these non-
judicial functions and that such activities
may be patriotic, desirable or expedient."
However, it is inadvisable for judges to en-
gage in such activities because it deters the
proper functioning of justice.' s
JUDICIAL CANON 2519-
BUSINESS PROMOTIONS AND SOLICITATIONS
FOR CHARITY
Radio and Television Broadcasts
Because dramatic television and radio
12 Id. at 203.
13 Ibid.
14 Independence of Judges: Should They Be Used
for Non-Judicial Work?, supra note 8, at 793.
1" Preamble, Canons of Professional Ethics, A.B.A.
CANONS 1.
16 JESSUP, THE PROFESSIONAL IDEALS OF THE LAW-
YER 58 (1925).
17 7 J.B.A. KAN. 172-73 (1938).
is Independence of Judges: Should They Be Used
for Non-Judicial Work?, 33 A.B.A.J. 792, 795
(1947).
"t) It has been suggested that this canon is unduly
restrictive. See PHILLIPS & MCCOY, CONDUCT OF
JUDGES AND LAWYERS 135 (1952).
broadcasts dealing with professional men
have attained immense popularity, the issue
of whether it is proper for a judge to appear
on such programs may be posed. Essentially,
the problem may be solved by determining
whether the program is commercially spon-
sored or whether it is of a sustaining, non-
commercial type.
The American Bar Association [herein-
after referred to as A.B.A.] has determined
that it is improper for a judge to appear on
a commercially-sponsored program which
simulates a judicial proceeding, on the
grounds that it would be an intolerable
affront to the dignity of the judicial pro-
cess.," The result of such a program would
be to lower the dignity of the judiciary by
transforming it into a medium for the enter-
tainment of the public. The prohibition
against a judge extends not only to his par-
ticipation in such a program but also to the
use of his name.
The Michigan State Bar Association has
considered the issue of whether the program
was commercially sponsored as immaterial.
Even if it was a sustaining program, it was
still of a commercial nature because such
programs were broadcast for the purpose of
self-advertising by the television or radio
station, and also to create a large audience
in order to sell it to a commercial sponsor.2 1
20 Opinion 166 (1936), A.B.A. CANONS 337. This
position has been criticized: "Is our traditional
suspicion of sponsored programs justified in view
of current business practices and production costs?
Also, if we assume that the appearances of a judge
on such a program is designed to and tends to auto-
matically increase the sponsor's business, aren't we
underestimating the intelligence of potential cus-
tomers and overestimating the 'power and prestige'
of the bench?" 16 FED. COM. B.J. 46 n. 2 (1958).
21 Opinion 166 (1956) of the Michigan State Bar
Association, 38 Micu. ST. B.J. 226 (1959). The
Association of the Bar has also adhered to this
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However, the A.B.A., in a recent opin-
ion,22 has refused to follow the lead of those
states adhering to the Michigan rule. While
the A.B.A. has reaffirmed its prohibition
against judges appearing on commercial pro-
grams, it now allows judges to appear on a
presentation simulating a judicial proceed-
ing, if it is sponsored or assisted by a bar
association. However, it must be made clear
that the program is only a simulated judicial
proceeding and it must conform to the high-
est standards of both the bench and bar.
Judges may also appear on panel discussions
or interviews only if such programs are
either sponsored or assisted by bar associa-
tions or are noncommercial programs. The
basis for the A.B.A.'s opinion would appear
to be the fact that many bar associations
have employed mass media to educate their
members and the public.
The question of a judge's appearance in
a motion picture has not yet been presented.
Movie studios normally publicize the names
of the performers in an effort to increase the
box-office appeal of the movie. Therefore,
in light of Canon 25's admonition to a
judge not to use the influence of his name
to promote the business interests of others,
such appearances would appear to be im-
proper. A judge should not lend himself to
the promotion of such "marketplace trans-
actions.1'2 3
Charitable Contributions
In many instances, a judge, prior to the
position. Opinion No. 776 (1952) of The Associa-
tion of The Bar of The City of New York, OPIN-
IONS ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICs 470 (1956) (herein-
after cited as N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. -). See 16
FED. COM. B.J., supra note 20, for the decision of
the California Judges' Advisory Committee on
Judicial Ethics in this area.
22 Opinion 298, 86 A.B.A. Reports 60 (Appendix)
(1961).
23 Opinion 166, supra note 20.
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assumption of judicial office, may have been
active in civic and charitable organizations
and may wish to continue his support of
such organizations.2 4 However, a judge's
activity on behalf of a charity has been ab-
solutely prohibited. For example, he may
neither personally solicit, 25 nor permit the
use of his name, 26 for charitable contribu-
tions. Nor may he permit his employees to
make an appeal for such contributions.2 7 On
the other hand, it is not improper for a judge
to attend charitable events, provided that he
does not permit his name to be used in con-
nection with such gatherings . 2
It is obvious that when applied to lawyers,
this rule is a salutary one since a lawyer may
feel coerced into making a contribution
rather than risk the wrath of a judge.2 9 How-
ever, when a judge solicits from the general
public the reason for such a rule would ap-
pear to be less obvious. It was thought that
the preservation of the public's confidence
in the impartiality of judges was so impor-
tant that it far outweighed whatever benefits
might be derived from charitable solicita-
tions by judges.30
Relations With Former Partners
When a member of a law firm becomes a
judge, it is improper for the law firm to re-
tain his name, 31 even though a new firm is
24N.Y.C.B.A. Opinion No. 800 (1955) 492.
25 N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 230 (1932) 113; Opin-
ion No. 104 (1917) of The New York County Law-
yers' Association, OPINIONS ON PROFESSIONAL
ETHICS 571 (1956) (hereinafter cited as N. Y Cty.
Lawyers' Ass'n Opinion No. -).
26 Opinion No. 230, supra note 25; N.Y.C.B.A.
Opinion No. 785 (1954) 478; N.YC.B.A. Opinion
No. 238 (1932) 118.
27 N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 287 (1933) 152.
28 Opinion No. 785, supra note 26.
29 See Opinion No. 287, supra note 27.
30 Opinion No. 785, supra note 26.
31 Opinion 143 (1935), A.B.A. CANONS 303;
created. 2 The reason for this is obvious. If
the judge's name is retained it might suggest
that the firm has a position of influence with
the judge.3 3 Litigants might then seek to em-
ploy the firm which retained his name.
Judges in Business
Before a discussion of the propriety of a
judge's participation in business is under-
taken it may be prudent to introduce some
background material. At common law a
judge was disqualified from hearing an ac-
tion in which he had a pecuniary interest. 34
The basis for such disqualification was that
no man should be a judge in his own cause. 35
In contrast to the common law, the
Canons of Judicial Ethics discourage a judge
from engaging in business activities since he
would actually use his name and the prestige
of his office to promote the business interests
of others. In this connection, the A.B.A.
stated that it was improper for a judge to
serve as a director of a bank. 36 It asserted
that since publicity is normally given by
banks to the members of their boards of
directors, it would appear that he was pro-
moting the business interests of others.
N.Y.C.B.A. Opinion No. 697 (1946) 411; N.Y.-
C.B.A. Opinion No. 36 (1926) 17; N. Y. Cty.
Lawyers' Ass'n Opinion No. 67 (1915) 549. See
Opinion 165 (1955) of the Michigan State Bar
Association, 38 MICH. ST. B.J. 222 (1959), where-
in it was held that a judge cannot pose in a picture
with his former associates.
32 N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 798 (1955) 490.
33 Opinion 143, supra note 31; Opinion No. 36,
supra note 31; Opinion No. 697, supra note 31.
34 Frank, Disqualification of Judges, 56 YALE L.J.
605, 609 (1947).
35 In the Matter of Ryers, 72 N. Y. 1, 10 (1878).
36 Opinion 254 (1943), A.B.A. CANONS 508. This
opinion has been criticized on the grounds that
judges are performing a public service when they
serve as directors and, also, that the A.B.A.'s posi-
tion "smacks of 'sermonizing.'" Wall SI., J., May
2, 1963, p. 17, col. 3.
When the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York [hereinafter referred to as
the Association of the Bar] was presented
with the question of whether it was proper
for a judge to serve as a director of a bank
or life insurance company, it answered in
the negative for two reasons.37
The Association of the Bar first decided
that because both types of commercial insti-
tutions normally publish the names of their
directors, the judge would in actuality be
promoting the financial interests of the busi-
ness. As its second reason, the Association
of the Bar adopted the common-law ap-
proach. It observed that banks and insur-
ance companies were normally involved in
a voluminous amount of litigation, especially
in the metropolitan area. This, in turn,
would increase the number of cases in which
the judge might have an interest.
Does a similar rule exist with respect to
other corporations, such as utilities and rail-
roads? All public corporations, to a greater
or lesser extent, advertise the names of
members of their boards. Therefore, a judge
would be promoting the business interests
of others, a practice frowned upon by the
A.B.A. and the Association of the Bar.
Also, if the practice of accepting board
directorships becomes prevalent, it may
shake public confidence in the judiciary.
The public may reason that the greater the
participation by the judiciary in business
interests, the greater the incidence of sub-
conscious favoritism in the conduct of litiga-
tion before them.38
37 N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 810 (1956) 500. It is
also improper for a judge to function as a chair-
man of an advisory committee of a corporation.
N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 51 (1926-27) 22.
38 See 72 CONG. REC. 3372-73 (1930) (remarks of
Senator Norris).
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It has been suggested that there would be
no impropriety if a judge serves as a direc-
tor of a private corporation. 0 Presumably,
the basis for this observation is that private
corporations do not advertise their director
personnel. Nevertheless, the private corpor-
ation or corporations of which a judge is a
director may be involved in litigation before
him. The argument may then be advanced
that a judge should disqualify himself be-
cause of his pecuniary interest. If judges fail
to disqualify themselves there would not be
an impartial administration of justice. On
the other hand, if judges were to disqualify
themselves frequently, the situation would
still not be remedied as this would lead to a
breakdown of the judicial process.4 ° There-
fore, the assumption of directorships by
judges, whether of a public or private cor-
poration, is to be deprecated. 4 1
An additional argument for avoiding in-
volvement in business activities is illustrated
by the experiences of Chief Judge Manton
of the Second Circuit.4 1 Judge Manton had
interests in many corporations, either in the
role of stockholder or director. When the
stock market collapsed in 1929 he plunged
heavily into debt. In order to extricate him-
30 DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 278 n. 16 (1953).
40 See Frank, supra note 34, at 608.
41 "Judges should be free from every tie which
may sway their judgment." VANDERBILT, JUDGES
AND JURORS 19 (1956). It has been suggested that
judges should, at the very least, place the corpora-
tions with which they are associated on a public
record. Wall St. J., supra note 36, at 17, col. 4.
Quaere: Is this not a form of indirect advertising
of the personnel of a corporation's board of direc-
tors since it requires a judge to do what a corpora-
tion would ordinarily do on its own? This would
also appear to be within the ambit of Canon 25's
prohibition against promoting the business inter-
ests of others.
S2See the excellent discussion in Vestal, A Study
in Perfidy, 35 IND. L.J. 17 (1959).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
self from his financial difficulties he accepted
gifts and loans from those involved in litiga-
tion before him. As a result, he was con-
victed of conspiracy to obstruct the orderly
administration of justice.4 3
In addition to serving as members of
boards of directors, judges have also en-
gaged in the sale of real estate and corporate
securities. When faced with the implications
raised by the sale of real estate, the Associa-
tion of the Bar was of the opinion that such
activity normally involved the practice of
law, and as such, constituted a question of
law which it would not answer. 44 It con-
ceded, however, that there is no inherent
limitation upon a judge participating in any
dignified business provided that it in no way
affects his ability to function effectively as
a judge.
It would appear that a most important
concept in its reasoning is the word "digni-
fied." While the sale of a car or refrigerator
by an individual is dignified because it is
honest labor, it is difficult to imagine a judge
entering the arena of common commercial
transactions. There does not appear to be
any definite standard by which it can be de-
termined what is "dignified." Therefore, the
question should be left for a judge to decide
on an ad hoc basis, bearing in mind what
impact his decision will have upon public
opinion.
43 United States v. Manton, 107 F. 2d 834 (2d Cir.
1938), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 664 (1939). With
regard to this nefarious episode, it has been ob-
served: "This unfortunate case emphasizes a dis-
tinct moral which has long been recognized, that
the members of the judiciary should not concern
themselves with the active conduct of business,
directly or indirectly .... Active conduct of busi-
ness affairs must inevitably give rise to injurious
comment which may reflect on the honor of the
Bench." Editorial, 25 A.B.A.J. 576, 577 (1939).
44N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 36 (1926) 17.
Clearly, the sale of corporate securities
by a judge is improper because it tends "to
detract from public confidence in the judi-
cial office."'45 If a judge sells corporate secu-
rities the public would tend to identify him
with the particular corporation and, in the
public's eye, he could not be impartial if
that corporation was involved in litigation
before him. Furthermore, if a judge sold
stock the public might assume that because
the judge's prestige was associated with the
corporation, purchase of its securities would
be a sound investment.
Therefore, a judge should avoid director-
ships as well as other business activities
which may promote the business interests of
others. With regard to businesses that are
"dignified" a judge should remember that
he occupies an exalted position in the com-
munity and that what is "dignified" for the
general public may not be "dignified" for a
judge."6
JUDICIAL CANON 26
PERSONAL INVESTMENTS AND RELATIONS
Personal Relations
The opinions which have considered Can-
on 26 have dealt primarily with a judge's
personal relations, rather than with his per-
sonal investments. Essentially, there are two
questions to be considered. The first deals
with the propriety of a judge's hearing an
action in which he is related to one of the
trial counsels, while the second arises when
a former employer of a judge is represent-
ing one of the parties to the action.
45N.Y. Cty. Lawyers' Ass'n Opinion No. 133
(1917) 587. It is also improper for a judge to en-
gage in the organization, promotion or financing
of a corporation. Ibid.
4G See Independence of Judges: Should They Be
Used for Non-Judicial Work?, 33 A.B.A.J. 792,
794 (1947).
When asked to decide whether or not it
was proper for a judge to hear a case in
which a close relative was involved as a trial
counsel, the A.B.A. indicated that it was
not.4 7 It conceded that although there was
nothing in the Canon which would expressly
preclude 4 a judge from presiding over such
a case, it would be more prudent if he did
not. Similarly, the Association of the Bar
has declared such action to be judicially im-
proper.49 Moreover, it has expressed dis-
favor when a judge hears a case in which a
near relative is in the employ of one of the
trial counsel. 50 In such a situation a judge
should refuse to hear the action unless his
removal from the case would result in long
delay or considerable expense.
Likewise, where the judge was formerly
in the employ of one of the trial counsel, it
would be improper for him to preside. If he
desires to sit he must first disclose his former
employment and his willingness to have an-
other judge hear the case. 5 1
Personal Investments
Judicial Canon 26 deters a judge from
making personal investments in enterprises
which are likely to be involved in litigation.
It also cautions that, while a judge does not
have to suffer a loss, he should attempt to
dispose of such investments.
The position of Canon 26 has been criti-
cized on the ground that it is the wise invest-
ments made by the practicing attorney that
47 N.Y.C.B.A. Opinion No. 200 (1931) 97.
48 Canon 26 handles this problem in general
terms: "It is desirable that he a judge should, so
far as reasonably possible, refrain from all rela-
tions which would normally tend to arouse the
suspicion that such relations warp or bias his judg-
ment, or prevent his impartial attitude of mind in
the administration of his judicial duties."
41, N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 456 (1938) 245.
50 Ibid.
N.YC.B.A. Opinion No. 491 (1939) 268.
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enable him to accept a judicial office. 52 Be-
fore an attempt to answer this criticism of
Canon 26 can be undertaken the reason for
its existence must be understood. At com-
mon law, a judge was disqualified from pre-
siding over a trial in which he had any finan-
cial interest that was direct and immediate.5 3
As long as his interest remained direct and
immediate he would be disqualified even if
the amount involved was small. 54 The only
means through which he could avoid dis-
qualification was to sell his interest in the
corporation before the commencement of
the action."
Is this criticism of Canon 26 justified? It
should be noted that Canon 26 warns against
investments which are "apt to be involved
in litigation." This criticism would be proper
if it warned against all investments; but, the
Canon does not go this far. It was apparent-
ly on this ground that the Association of the
Bar decided that it was proper for a judge
to have a financial interest in a coal com-
pany.5e, While it is true that coal companies
52 PHILLIPS & McCoY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND
LAWYERS 134 (1952).
53 Andes v. Ely, 158 U. S. 312, 323-24 (1895); See
Blakeman v. Harwell, 198 Ga. App. 165, 173, 31
S.E. 2d 50, 54-55 (1944). A judge was disqualified
if he was a stockholder in a corporation which was
interested in the property involved in the contro-
versy even though the corporation was not a for-
mal party to the action. Adams v. Minor, 121 Cal.
372, 53 Pac. 815 (1898).
54 State ex rel. First Am. Bank & Trust Co. v.
Chillingworth, 95 Fla. 699, 705, 116 So. 633, 635
(1928). Ownership of stock in a corporation dis-
qualifies a judge and the consent of the parties will
not confer jurisdiction. Queens-Nassau Mortgage
Co. v. Graham, 157 App. Div. 489, 142 N. Y
Supp. 589 (2d Dep't 1913).
55 E.g., Andes v. Ely, supra note 53; Palmer v.
Lawrence, 5 N. Y 389 (1851). See also Henderson
v. Tillamook Hotel Co., 76 Ore. 379, 384, 148
Pac. 57, 59 (1915).
51 N.Y.C.B.A. Opinion No. 51 (1926-27) 22.
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might be involved in litigation, 5 it is not the
type of investment against which Canon 26
warns.
What, then, is a general rule that a
judge might apply when the opportunity for
personal investment is presented. Although
no general rule has been expressly laid
down, an analogy to Canon 25 and the
directorship problem may be drawn.
In the discussion of that Canon, it was
held that a judge should not be a director of
a bank or insurance company because such
enterprises were usually involved in volu-
minous litigation. Applying this rule to the
stockholding situation, a judge should avoid
making investments in banking, insurance
or allied stocks.
With respect to divesting himself of per-
sonal investments, this rule would also ap-
pear to be applicable. It may be conceded
that, on occasion, this will work a hardship,
but it is to be remembered that when a judge
57 Of course, if the coal company became involved
in litigation, the judge who holds stock in it can-
not perform any act requiring judicial discretion.
Opinion 170 (1937), A.B.A. CANONS 343. See also
Washington Ins. Co. v. Price, 1 Hopk. Ch. 1 (N.Y
1823); King v. Thompson, 59 Ga. 380 (1877). A
co-operative is akin to a commercial corporation
in the sense that it declares dividends or, perhaps,
provides services in the community, such as the
supply of electricity. Hence, a member of a co-
operative is similar to a stockholder in a commer-
cial corporation. This is the ground upon which a
judge is disqualified from presiding over a case
where a co-operative, of which he is a member, is
involved in litigation. Pahl v. Whitt, 304 S.W.2d
250, 252 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957). If a judge is a
member of a co-operative which is normally in-
volved in a great deal of litigation it would appear
that a judge should terminate his membership
therein. However, if a judge is a member of a non-
profit mutual co-operative he would not be dis-
qualified from hearing a case involving such a co-
operative because no pecuniary advantage could
accrue to him. Fehr v. Hadden, 134 Colo. 102, 300
P.2d 533 (1956).
assumes the privileges that are coexistent
with judicial office he also assumes the bur-
dens of such office.55
JUDICIAL CANON 32
GIFTS AND FAVORS
Thou shalt not accept person nor gifts; for
gifts blind the eyes of the wise, and change
the words of the just. Deuteronomy 16:19.
Adopting the spirit of this maxim, Canon
32 would make it improper for a judge to
accept a gift from a litigant, one who prac-
tices before him or those who are likely to
be involved in litigation before him. There
are three grounds for this prohibition.
First, the practice of judges accepting
gifts would most probably promote unjust
decisions by members of the judiciary.5 9
Secondly, even if the judge accepted the gift
in perfect good faith, the possibility is very
great that he might subconsciously favor the
donor."' Finally, there is the threat of public
scandal. If a judge accepted a gift and it
became a matter of public knowledge, the
public would, most likely, suspect his integ-
rity and impartiality. 61
Canon 32 distinguishes between three
classes of donors. The A.B.A. has ruled it
improper for a judge to accept a sum of
money from one who normally practices
before him in exchange for a worthless
mortgage on the judge's home.62 In In re
Harriss,6 a judge had sentenced a defendant
to prison. Because he believed her to be in-
nocent, however, he interceded on her be-
half when she petitioned for parole and, for
58 Opinion 142 (1935), A.B.A. CANONS 300.
59 DAVIS, THE MORAL OBLIGATIONS OF CATHOLIC
CIVIL JUDGES 41 (1953).
60 Ibid.
61 See id. at 41-42.
62 Opinion 89 (1932), A.B.A. CANONS 199.
63 364 111. App. 290, 4 N.E.2d 387 (1936).
his efforts, he received two hundred dollars.
As a result of these activities the judge was
censured. While the prisoner was no longer
a litigant before the judge, the parole pro-
ceeding was so closely related to the decision
rendered by the judge that the acceptance of
the money would be subject to misunder-
standing and misinterpretation.34 If it is im-
proper for a judge to accept a gift under
such circumstances, a fortiori, when an indi-
vidual is actually a litigant, the acceptance
of a gift is improper.
The third class of donors, those whose
interests are likely to be submitted to him for
judgment, is particularly interesting. In the
case of In re Stolen,6 5 a judge accepted loans
of money from criminals in exchange for his
unsecured promissory notes and then pre-
sided over controversies involving his credi-
tors. This conduct was deemed to be im-
proper because a "judge who voluntarily
places himself under obligation to the crimi-
nal element of his judicial district ... and
who sits in judgment upon the case of his
debtor [creditor?], shocks the public confi-
dence in his court. .... ,,66 While Judge Stolen
did actually preside over a proceeding in
which his creditors were involved, neverthe-
less, the tenor of the decision is such that
even the receipt of the money was deemed
improper. Thus, a judge should avoid ac-
cepting gifts from individuals who are likely
to be involved in litigation before him.
There is also the possibility that corpora-
tions might endeavor to present a gift to a
judge. When this occurs, the standard pre-
viously enunciated with respect to director-
ships may be applied. If a bank or insurance
64 Id. at 292, 4 N.E.2d at 388.
65 193 Wis. 602, 214 N.W. 379 (1927).
66 Id. at 614, 214 N.W. at 386.
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company attempts to offer a gift a judge
should refuse the same. Again, the fact that
such enterprises are normally involved in
an immense amount of litigation serves as
a basis for this holding. With regard to other
corporations, individual prudence should
dictate the propriety of acceptance of such
gifts.
A discussion of the value of a proposed
gift may also be fruitful. Clearly, there is no
justification for the receipt of a valuable gift
by a judge. Where small gifts are involved,
however, the dangers of an unjust decision
or subconscious favoritism do not appear to
be dominant. Nevertheless, the public may
misinterpret such gifts and suspect the judge
of dishonesty. 6
It has been suggested that the only cir-
cumstance when a judge could accept a gift
would be when personal friendship was in-
volved, the litigation was terminated and the
gift had no connection with the decision. 6
This suggestion, however, may be criticized
on two grounds. If a litigant happens to be
a personal friend of a judge, the prudent
course of action would seem to lie in a
judge disqualifying himself. This observa-
tion is buttressed by Canon 33: "He should
... in pending... litigation... be particu-
larly careful to avoid such action as may
reasonably tend to awaken the suspicion
that his.., friendships constitute an element
in influencing his judicial conduct." Further-
more, the acceptance of a gift after a final
determination in which a friend is involved,
would lead to the loss of public trust. In all
probability, the public would conclude that
the gift was agreed upon before the judge's
decision and that his acceptance of the gift
afterwards was merely a subterfuge.
67 DAVIS, op. cit. supra note 59, at 42.
Cs Id. at 44.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
In summary, the acceptance of a gift,
whether valuable or not, should be avoided.
Furthermore, the time and circumstances
under which the gift is offered as well as
the relationship of the donor to the donee
are also irrelevant.
JUDICIAL CANON 33 SOCIAL RELATIONS
Religious, Educational and Societal Institu-
tions
Prior to becoming a judge, an individual
may have been active in religious, educa-
tional and societal institutions. Since a judge
is absolutely prohibited from engaging in
activity in behalf of a charitable organiza-
tion, the extent to which he may be associ-
ated with the above-named institutions may
be appropriate for investigation.
A judge is not per se disqualified from
presiding over a case in which a church or
society, of which he is a member, is in-
volved.6 9 However, if such an institution is
involved in litigation, the result of which
would affect it financially, he would then be
disqualified.7 0 For example, an educational
institution which is affiliated with a particu-
lar religion, might become a litigant when
some of its students object to conforming
with its religion-oriented standards of con-
duct.7 1 If a judge were a member of the
board of trustees of such institution, or
even a faculty member, 72 he would not be
69 Blakeman v. Harwell, 198 Ga. 165, 174, 31
S.E.2d 50, 55 (1944).
70 Appeal of Askounes, 144 Pa. Super. 293, 298,
19 A.2d 846, 848 (1941).
71 See the factual situation presented in Carr v. St.
John's University, 12 N.Y2d 802, 187 N.E.2d 18,
235 N.YS.2d 834 (1963).
72 It has been held that a judge was not disquali-
fied from acting as the presiding judge in a con-
demnation proceeding for the benefit of a univer-
sity, even though he was also a faculty member of
the university. Board of Educ. v. Getz, 321 Mich.
676, 33 N.W.2d 113 (1948).
disqualified since he would not have a fi-
nancial interest.
While it is true that a judge, in the above
hypothetical would not have to withdraw,
nevertheless, he should consider the effect
that non-disqualification would have upon
the public. Since the public could reason-
ably conclude that the judge was not im-
partial, he should consider disqualifying
himself because not only must he be im-
partial, but he must also appear to be im-
partial.
CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that more precise
rules concerning the activities of judges
should be promulgated. 3 This contention
appears to have merit, especially with re-
spect to directorships and to the perform-
ance of services for the executive branch
of the government.
Further clarification is needed in the area
of corporate directorships because it is not
clear whether it is proper for a judge to be
a director of a public corporation, other
than a bank or insurance company. Nor is
it clear whether it is proper for a judge to
serve on the board of directors of a private
corporation.
Since one of the express purposes of the
Code of Judicial Ethics is to serve "as a
proper guide and reminder to judges, ' 7 4 the
Code will not be fulfilling its function if it
does not provide more precise standards
for judges in these problem areas.
Although it is a code which regulates
the activities of judges, it cannot expressly
provide for all the particular situations with
73 Wall St. J., May 2, 1963, p. 17, vol. 4.
74 Preamble, Canons of Judicial Ethics, A.B.A.
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